Efficient taxation of fuel and road use by Bjertnæs, Geir H. M.
D
ISCU
SSIO
N
 PAPERS
905
Geir H. M. Bjertnæs
Efficient taxation of fuel and 
road use 
Discussion Papers No. 905, April 2019 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Geir H. M. Bjertnæs 
Efficient taxation of fuel and road use  
Abstract: 
This study calculates efficient taxes on fuel and road use designed to combat driving related 
externalities. The study shows that the efficient road user charge on fuel is below the marginal 
mileage-related damage to prevent tax avoidance due to an excessive economic driving-style. The 
current US tax rate on gasoline is way below the efficient tax rate while the current UK rate is slightly 
above the efficient rate in this case. The efficient tax on fuels exceeds the marginal damage of CO2-
emissions to promote an economic driving-style when the tax is combined with a GPS-based tax on 
road use. The efficient GPS-based tax rate on road use is reduced below the marginal damage of 
mileage-related externalities in this case.    
Keywords: Transportation, optimal taxation, environmental taxation, global warming. 
JEL classification: H2, H21, H23, Q58, R48. 
Acknowledgements: I am highly grateful for valuable comments from Vidar Christiansen, Bjart 
Holtsmark, Paal Brevik Wangsness and attendees at the OFS workshop on taxes 2018. 
Address: Geir H. M. Bjertnæs, Statistics Norway, Research Department, P. B. 2633,  
St. Hanshaugen 0131 Oslo, Norway, E-mail: ghb@ssb. 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a Dis-
cussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it may 
include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
© Statistics Norway 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers 
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/discussion-papers 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
ISSN 1892-753X (electronic) 
3 
Sammendrag 
Veitransport er viktig for å opprettholde en effektiv flyt av varer, tjenester og mennesker. 
Veitransporten genererer imidlertid ulemper i form av CO2-utslipp, lokal luftforurensning, ulykker, 
køer og støy. Mange land har innført avgifter på drivstoff og veibruk for å dempe ulempene knyttet til 
både forbruk av drivstoff og kjøring. Valg av kjørestil som reduserer drivstofforbruket kan påvirke 
ulempene, samt hvordan avgiftene bør utformes. Denne studien analyserer hvordan avgiftene på 
drivstoff og veibruk bør utformes når man tar hensyn til disse momentene i en økonomisk modell for 
konsumentenes etterspørsel etter transporttjenester. 
 
Studien viser at en samfunnsøkonomisk effektiv veibruksavgift på drivstoff er lavere enn den 
gjennomsnittlige marginale veibruksrelaterte ulempen. Forklaringen finnes ved å studere hvordan 
avgiften påvirker transportatferden. Husholdningene vil tilpasse seg slik at privatøkonomisk nytte 
minus kostnader av drivstofforbruk på marginen er lik avgiften på drivstoff. Det oppstår dermed en 
samfunnsøkonomisk kostnad per liter redusert drivstofforbruk som på marginen er lik avgiften. 
Drivstofforbruket reduseres da som følge av en reduksjon i omfanget av veitransport, samt som følge 
av et lavere drivstofforbruk per kjørte kilometer. Reduksjonen i omfanget av veitransporten realisere 
en samfunnsøkonomisk gevinst i form av reduserte veibruksrelaterte ulemper. Gevinsten per liter 
redusert drivstofforbruk er imidlertid lavere enn den gjennomsnittlige marginal veibruksrelaterte 
ulempen når en del av reduksjonen i drivstofforbruket skyldes et lavere drivstofforbruk per kjørte 
kilometer. En mer økonomisk kjørestil realiserer også gevinster som følge av et redusert omfang av 
ulykker. Den sistnevnte effekten er imidlertid mer beskjeden. Den effektive veibruksavgiften på 
drivstoff blir derfor lavere enn den gjennomsnittlige marginale veibruksrelaterte ulempen.  
 
En numerisk modellanalyse viser at dagens amerikanske avgiftssats på bensin er vesentlig lavere enn 
den samfunnsøkonomisk effektive avgiftssatsen, mens den britiske avgiftssatsen er litt høyere. Den 
norske avgiftssatsen på bensin pluss gjennomsnittlige utgifter til bompenger utgjør til sammen en 
veibruksavgift som er nesten dobbelt så høy som den effektive avgiftssatsen på bensin. De norske 
veibruksavgiftene for dieselkjøretøy er også høyere enn den effektive avgiftssatsen på diesel.    
 
Studien viser også at det er samfunnsøkonomisk effektivt å kombinere en veibruksavgift på drivstoff 
med en GPS-basert veibruksavgift. En slik avgiftssats på drivstoff realiserer en mer økonomisk 
kjørestil, som igjen innebærer færre ulykker. Den effektive GPS-baserte avgiften på veibruk er lavere 
enn den marginale veibruksrelaterte ulempen i dette tilfellet for å motvirke overbeskatning av kjøring.      
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1. Introduction   
Road transport is essential to maintain an efficient flow of goods, services and people, but generates 
costly negative externalities in the form of CO2 emissions, local air pollution, accidents, congestion 
and noise. Many countries have implemented taxes on fuels to curb externalities linked to both fuel 
and mileage. However, the tax-induced gain in terms of reduced externalities is diminished as less 
than half of the reduction in fuel use is due to reduced driving, see Parry and Small (2005) and several 
other studies which argue that the optimal tax rates on gasoline are reduced accordingly. The 
remaining reduction is due to improved fleet fuel efficiency. Fleet fuel efficiency improves as 
households avoid the mileage-related tax component on fuel by purchasing more fuel-efficient 
vehicles. Bjertnæs (2019) however shows that such avoidance should be prevented by imposing 
heavier taxation of fuel-efficient vehicles compared to fuel-intensive vehicles, and hence, that it is sub-
optimal to lower the tax rate on gasoline. The efficient tax rate on gasoline, which equals the marginal 
damage of driving in this case, is above current tax rates in both the US and the UK.  
 
However, fleet fuel efficiency also improves as households choose a more fuel-efficient driving-style, 
see e.g. Barkenbus (2010). Montag (2015) shows that efficient vehicle specific taxes on fuel or 
mileage implements first-best choices of vehicles, driving distance, and driving-style. A tax on fuel 
may however create an incentive to save fuel rather than lowering mileage-related damage. A fuel-
saving driving-style may also reduce accidents, see Aarts and van Schagen (2006). A tax on fuel 
combined with GPS-based road user charges may prevent avoidance due to an economic driving-style. 
These unexplored objections related to the optimal tax rate on fuel calls for further investigations.     
  
The present study contributes to this literature by exploring how taxes on fuel and road use should be 
designed to combat driving related externalities when agents choose the amount of driving and 
driving-style. A new model framework is developed which calculates tax formulas that are comparable 
with current taxation of fuel and road use. The study shows that the efficient road user charge on fuel 
is below the marginal mileage-related damage. The explanation is that the tax-induced reduction in 
driving, and hence gain in terms of reduced externalities, is diminished as households also responds by 
choosing a more fuel-efficient driving-style. The more fuel-efficient driving-style also contributes to 
reduce accidents, and hence, increase the tax-induced gain in terms of reduced externalities. This latter 
effect is however more modest. By use of a numerical model it is found that the current US tax rate on 
gasoline is way below the efficient rate while the current UK rate is slightly above the efficient rate in 
this case.  
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The study also calculates optimal combination of taxes on fuel and road use. The efficient tax on fuel 
exceeds the marginal damage of CO2 -emissions to promote an economic driving-style which lowers 
accidents when the tax is combined with a GPS-based tax on road use. The efficient GPS-based tax 
rate on road use is reduced below the marginal damage of mileage-related externalities in this case to 
prevent excessive taxation of driving.    
 
The rest of the paper is divided into six sections; Section 2 provides a literature review, Section 3 
presents the model and Section 4 presents optimal taxes on fuel and road use. Parameter values are 
presented in Section 5. Current taxes in selected countries are compared with optimal taxes in section 
6. Section 7 concludes.   
2. Literature review    
Parry and Small (2005) show that the optimal uniform tax rate on gasoline in the United States is more 
than twice the current rate, while that for the United Kingdom is about half the current rate. Their 
optimal tax rate on gasoline consists of an adjusted Pigouvian tax component which includes damage 
from carbon emissions and other driving-related externalities, a Ramsey tax component designed to 
raise tax revenue, and a congestion feedback component which captures welfare gains as labor supply 
increases as congestion decreases. Driving-related externalities due to congestion and accidents as 
well as the Ramsey tax component are dominant, while global warming and congestion feedback are 
modest. Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) estimate higher accident-related externalities, which 
suggests that the UK gasoline tax is closer to the optimal level than the US tax. Several objections can 
be made to the methodology in Parry and Small (2005), however. First, a general set of assumptions 
excludes the Ramsey tax component from a welfare-maximizing tax system, see Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1976)1. Indeed, Jacobs and de Mooij (2015) show that a Pigouvian tax on polluting goods is part of a 
welfare-maximizing tax system within a Mirrlees-economy framework2. Second, the gain in terms of 
reduced externalities per liter of fuel is diminished by the fact that households avoid the mileage-
related tax component on fuel by purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles according to Parry and Small 
(2005)3. Bjertnæs (2019) on the other hand shows that it is more efficient to prevent such avoidance 
                                                     
1 Taxation of consumer goods designed to redistribute income is not part of an optimal tax system.    
2 Results in the literature differ on the issue of whether environmental taxes should deviate from the Pigouvian rate due to tax revenue 
requirements. The optimal tax rate in Parry and Small (2005) is lower due to tax revenue requirements. Jaeger (2011), however, finds that the 
need for tax revenue contributes to increasing the optimal environmental tax wedge to higher than the Pigouvian tax rate. The optimal CO2 
tax also exceeds the quota price when the government purchase quotas and the marginal cost of public funds exceed one, according to 
Bjertnæs et. al. (2013).  
3 A range of other studies have adopted their method to calculate optimal tax rates on gasoline in other countries; see e.g. Anton-Sarabia and 
Hernandez-Trillo (2014), Lin and Zeng (2014). 
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by imposing heavier taxation of fuel-efficient vehicles compared to fuel-intensive vehicles. He shows 
that the optimal tax rate on gasoline is above current tax rates in both the US and the UK. Bjertnæs 
(2019) however did not consider avoidance of road user charges on fuel due to an excessive economic 
driving-style.    
 
Innes (1996), Fullerton and West (2002) and Montag (2015) show different cases where vehicle 
specific taxes on fuel consumption or mileage perfectly reflect driving related externalities, and hence, 
implement first-best allocations. Fullerton and West (2002) explore tax combinations that implement 
the social planner choices of mileage, engine size, pollution control equipment, and fuel type. Montag 
(2015) shows that efficient vehicle specific taxes on fuel or mileage implements first-best choices of 
vehicles, driving distance, and fuel economy due to driving-style. His mileage tax depends on actual 
fuel consumption, and hence, is equivalent to a differentiated tax on fuel4. A tax on fuel may however 
create an incentive to save fuel rather than lowering mileage-related damage. A tax on fuel is also 
likely to reduce accidents, see Grabowski and Morrissey, 2004 and 2006. Motorists can certainly 
improve their fuel economy by choosing a more economic driving-style, see Barkenbus 2010, Carrico 
et al., 2009; Onoda, 2009; Tong et al., 2000; Van Mierlo et al., 2004; Vandenbergh et al., 2008. The 
impact on mileage-related damage is however more uncertain. Economic driving is not likely to 
reduce traffic congestion problems. A larger spread in speeds may boost accidents and traffic 
congestion according to Lave (1985), Aarts and van Schagen (2006) and Elvik (2014). Less aggressive 
driving at lower speeds however contribute to lower accidents according to Aarts and van Schagen, 
2006, van Benthem, 2015, Rodriguez (1990) and Montag, 2014. Lower speeds also generate less noise 
pollution, see Bendtsen (2004). Hence, further investigations are required to determine the efficient tax 
rate on fuel when motorists choose driving-style.      
 
There are several other shortcomings connected with a road user charge on fuel, see e.g. Parry et al. 
(2007) and Ashley et al. (2017). First, a vehicle specific tax on fuel may lead to costly monitoring to 
prevent high-tax fuel vehicles from using low-tax fuel. A uniform tax on fuel is not hampered by this 
shortcoming, however. Second, a road user charge on fuel does not differentiate between geographic 
locations or peak and off-peak periods. Third, electric vehicles are exempt from a road user charge 
levied on fuel. Most of these problems are avoided if the road user charge on fuel is replaced with 
GPS-based road user charges. It is however challenging to implement a GPS-based system which 
rewards reductions in damage due to an economic driving-style. A tax on fuel might be a useful 
                                                     
4 A tax based on odometer readings is also hampered by avoidance if drivers can roll back their odometers.  
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complement. Further investigations are required to determine the efficient combination of taxes on 
fuel and mileage in this case.   
 
The present study contributes by calculating optimal taxes on fuel and road use when motorists choose 
the amount of driving and driving-style. These optimal taxes are constructed to alleviate external 
damage from road traffic. Hence, Pigouvian taxes are optimal when available. Choice of vehicles is 
excluded from the study because the efficient tax rate on fuel is not directly influenced by such 
choices according to Bjertnæs (2019). Plausible assumptions about driving related behavior imply that 
the optimal road user charge on fuel is below the average marginal damage of road use5. The optimal 
CO2 tax on fuel however equals the marginal damage of CO2-emissions. The current US tax on 
gasoline is below the optimal tax rate in this case. The current UK tax rate is slightly above the 
optimal tax rate. The current Norwegian tax rate on gasoline plus average toll on toll roads is almost 
twice as large as the optimal rate. The study also calculates optimal combination of taxes on fuel and 
road use. The optimal tax on fuel exceeds the marginal damage of CO2-emissions when the tax is 
combined with a GPS-based tax on road use. The marginal tax burden of driving however equals the 
total marginal damage of driving. Hence, the optimal GPS-based tax rate on road use is reduced below 
the marginal damage of mileage-related externalities in this case. 
3. The model  
An economical driving style can result in a significant reduction in fuel consumption according to 
studies mentioned above. A more economical driving-style entails, among other things, less aggressive 
acceleration, driving at lower and more stable speeds, driving in high gear, less running at idle, less 
use of air conditioning, more planning of road selection, choice of tires with low rolling resistance, 
engine maintenance, and avoiding excess weight and load that increases air resistance, see Carrico et 
al. 2009, Dietz et al. 2009, Gonder et al. 2012, Wang et al. 2008 and Ko et al. 2010. Studies also show 
that motorists are able to change behavior, see for example Barkenbus (2010), Onoda (2009) and 
Beusen et al. (2009). Most of the measures can be implemented without investment costs. However, 
economical driving requires taking time to run economically. Households therefore faces a trade-off. 
A more economical driving-style means longer travel time. The benefit is reduced fuel consumption, 
and hence, lower fuel costs. The tax rate on fuel will affect this trade-off, as well as the household's 
choice of mileage. The model framework incorporates these considerations. The problem is analyzed 
in a partial model framework where a representative household chooses mileage and driving-style. The 
                                                     
5 The average damage is relevant when a uniform tax is employed to correct for different externalities, see Diamond (1973).  
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tax on fuel affects the choice of mileage as well as driving-style. The government chooses tax rates so 
that welfare is maximized. Welfare is defined as households' utility minus damage associated with 
negative external effects of vehicle use.  
 
3.1 Households  
Household utility, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, net of externalities is given by the quasilinear utility function  
𝑢𝑢 = 𝑒𝑒(𝑚𝑚) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 + 𝑐𝑐.                                                                                                          (1)  
The utility is determined by the sub-utility of driving, 𝑒𝑒(𝑚𝑚), minus the cost of time spent 
driving, 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚, plus consumption of a non-polluting good, 𝑐𝑐. Driving distance measured in kilometer 
is denoted 𝑚𝑚. Time spent driving per kilometer is denoted ℎ𝑑𝑑. The marginal utility of an extra 
kilometer, 𝑒𝑒´(𝑚𝑚) is positive but decreasing, 𝑒𝑒´´(𝑚𝑚) < 0. Time spent on driving has an alternative 
value equal to the after-tax wage rate, 𝑤𝑤. The working time has a higher alternative cost due to taxes 
on the return on working. The alternative cost of time spent driving would consequently exceed the 
private alternative cost. This creates a welfare gain connected to lowering time spent driving which 
should be considered when tax formulas are constructed. Such alternative costs is however not 
included in the model framework. Consumption of other consumer goods, 𝑐𝑐, is given by total 
consumption opportunity, 𝑦𝑦�, minus fuel consumption.  
𝑐𝑐 = 𝑦𝑦� − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚                                                                                                                 (2)  
Fuel costs depend on the price of fuel, 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙, the number of kilometers driven, 𝑚𝑚, and consumption of 
fuel per kilometer, 𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑). Consumption per kilometer decreases with time spent driving per 
kilometer, 𝑟𝑟´(ℎ𝑑𝑑) < 0, but with a decreasing rate, 𝑟𝑟´´(ℎ𝑑𝑑) > 0, so that the second order condition for 
the household problem is satisfied. 
3.2 Damage of driving  
Damage from CO2-emissions is determined by the accumulated number of liters consumed, 𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚, 
multiplied by the cost of CO2 emissions per liter consumed, 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2. 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 =  𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚                                                                                                              (3) 
Mileage-related damage is determined by the number of kilometers driven and the price of damage per 
kilometer, 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑). The cost of damage per kilometer depends on driving time per kilometer, ℎ𝑑𝑑.  
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 =  𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚                                                                                                                      (4) 
This damage function is tailor maid for the present study. The function separates between mileage, 𝑚𝑚, 
and damage per kilometer, 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑). Hence, the function is able to separate between policy which 
affects damage due to mileage, and policy which affects damage due to driving-style.             
si'
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3.3 The social planner solution 
The social planner solution maximizes the representative consumer's utility minus the damage caused 
by road transport. The problem is 
               Max
𝑚𝑚,ℎ𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒(𝑚𝑚) + 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚−𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚− 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚.                              (5)   
First order conditions imply that   
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑) = 0                                                            (6)   
 and                                                                                     
−𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚−𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚− 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚− 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚 = 0.                                                      (7)   
Hence,  
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚 = (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) + 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)                                                                         (8)   
and  
−(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2)𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) = 𝑤𝑤.                                                                                  (9)   
Second order conditions are satisfied, see appendix A.  
4. Optimal tax rates 
4.1 Pigouvian taxes 
Pigouvian taxes is defined as tax rates on market activities which equals the marginal external damage 
generated by this market activity. There are two types of market activities within the present model 
framework, 𝑚𝑚 and ℎ𝑑𝑑. Implementation of Pigouvian taxes therefore require tax rates on each of these 
activities which equals the marginal damage of these activities6. The marginal damage of these 
activities is found by taking the derivative of the damage functions, equation (3) and (4), with respect 
to 𝑚𝑚 and ℎ𝑑𝑑. This gives 
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)                                                                                                 (10)   
and 
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚.                                                                                      (11)   
The Pigouvian tax on driven kilometers is positive because it represents a cost associated with CO2 
emissions, as well as a cost associated with driving-related externalities. The Pigouvian tax on driving 
                                                     
6 Road transport in the production sector is ignored. Tax formulas within this study are however relevant if Pigouvian taxes are desirable in 
the production sector.  
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time per kilometer is negative because CO2 -emissions are reduced and because mileage-related 
damage are dampened by a more economical driving style.  
 
Assume that tax revenue from these taxes is transferred lump sum to the representative consumer.                  
𝑘𝑘 = 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑                                                                                                               (12)   
Hence, transfers, 𝑘𝑘, equals the tax rate on driving, 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚, multiplied with driving distance plus the tax rate 
on time spent driving per kilometer, 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑, multiplied with time spent driving. The household budget 
constraint is given by equation (13).  
𝑐𝑐 = 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚− 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑                                                                        (13)  
The household's problem then becomes 
               Max
𝑚𝑚,ℎ𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒(𝑚𝑚) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑.                                      (14)   
First order conditions imply that   
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑 − 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 = 0                                                                                      (15)   
 and                                                                                     
−𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚−𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚− 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 0.                                                                                        (16)   
Implementing Pigouvian taxes, equation (10) and (11), into equation (15) and (16), and comparing 
with the social planner solution, equation (6) and (7), shows that these solutions are identical. 
Implementation of these Pigouvian tax rates are however challenging as the government is unable to 
observe driving-style. Hence, the government is unable to implement such subsidies. Many countries 
have chosen to implement a tax on fuel only to correct for damage connected to road traffic. The 
sections below analyze the case where a tax on fuel alone is implemented to correct for external effects 
of road transport.  
4.2 An optimal tax on fuel  
The optimal tax rate on fuel is constructed to alleviate external damage from road traffic. This 
represents a second-best strategy when Pigouvian taxes are unavailable. An optimal environmental tax 
on polluting goods equals the optimal difference between tax rates on polluting and non-polluting 
goods according to Fullerton (1997). Hence, the optimal tax rate on fuel in the present study should be 
interpreted as an optimal difference in tax rates between fuel and non-polluting goods.  
 
The household chooses driving distance and driving time per kilometer to maximize their utility. The 
consumer price on fuel equals the producer price plus the tax on fuel. The household's problem is 
               Max
𝑚𝑚,ℎ𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒(𝑚𝑚) + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑘𝑘 − (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚−𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚.                                                      (17)   
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First order conditions imply that  
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚 − (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 0                                                                                    (18)   
 and                                                                                     
−(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚−𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚 = 0.                                                                                        (19)   
Hence,  
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚 = (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) + 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑                                                                                           (20)   
and  
−(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) = 𝑤𝑤.                                                                                                     (21)   
Equation (20) and (21) determines 𝑚𝑚 and ℎ𝑑𝑑 as a function of 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙. Second order conditions are satisfied, 
see appendix B. A tax increase leads to lower mileage and more economic driving, see appendix E.   
 
The government maximizes the indirect utility function minus external damage. Tax revenue are 
transferred to the representative agent. The government's problem is 
               Max
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
 𝑒𝑒(𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)) + 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) −                                                𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙))𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙).                                                                              (22)  
First order conditions imply that  
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
∗ = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) � 11+𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑�𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) �                                                                           (23)     
+ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑
𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1
1+
1
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑
𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑�𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) ⎦⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
, 
see Appendix C. Parameter values are restricted to those that satisfies the second order condition, see 
Appendix D. Equation (23) shows that the welfare maximizing tax rate, 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙∗, is determined by marginal 
damages connected to driving and traffic related elasticities. The optimization problem in expressions 
(22) reveals that the welfare maximizing tax on fuel is chosen so that the welfare cost of a marginal 
increase in the tax equals the welfare gain of reduced damage due to the marginal tax increase. The 
welfare cost equals the reduction in the marginal utility of driving due to the marginal tax increase 
minus the cost of time spent driving minus the cost of fuel. The welfare gain equals the environmental 
benefit connected to the marginal increase in the tax on fuel, represented by a reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions and reduced mileage-related damage.  
 
A comparison of equation (23) with the Pigou tax on driving shows that the Pigou tax represents a 
special case. The optimum fuel tax deviates from the Pigou tax when the tax affects choice of driving-
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style. There are two reasons for this. The optimal tax is reduced because a more economical driving-
style leads to avoidance of the road user charge on fuel, see also Parry and Small (2005). The optimal 
tax is however increased when a more economical driving-style dampens mileage-related damage.   
4.3 Optimal taxes on fuel and road use 
GPS-based road user charges can be designed to matches mileage-related damage of driving. GPS-
pricing allows for geographic differentiation, differentiation between different vehicles, and 
differentiation based on traffic density throughout the day. It is however problematic to design GPS-
pricing which rewards an economic driving-style. Speed limits, traffic rules and taxes on liability 
insurance will to some extent regulate reckless behavior in road traffic. Such rules and regulations are 
however not likely to harvest all potential gains connected to an economic driving-style. It is therefore 
assumed that GPS-based road user charges are unable to reward an economic driving-style. This 
section calculates optimal combination of taxes on fuel and such GPS-based road user charges.  
 
The government chooses tax rates to maximize welfare when the representative household choose 
mileage and driving-style. A new tax is introduced on the number of kilometers driven, 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚. 
Households' maximization problem is otherwise identical to the problem in section 4.2. The first-order 
conditions are  
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚 = (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) + 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑 + 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚                                                                                 (24)   
and 
−(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) = 𝑤𝑤.                                                                                                    (25)   
The government now has two instruments to meet 2 objectives. It is therefore possible to implement 
the social planner solution. This solution is the welfare maximizing solution, as tax rates are chosen to 
maximize the same expression as in the social planner solution. The optimum fuel tax is found by 
setting the tax on fuel in equation (25) so that driving time per kilometer is chosen as in equation (9) in 
the social planner solution. This gives 
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
∗∗ = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)                                                                                       (26)      
The optimum tax on driven kilometers is found by inserting the tax on fuel in equation (26) into 
equation (24). The tax on mileage in equation (24) is chosen so that the number of kilometers driven is 
identical with the social planner solution, equation (8). Note that the tax on mileage represents a GPS-
based tax on road use. This simple modelling approach is feasible and tractable because of the tailor 
maid mileage-related damage function.  
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚
∗∗
𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) = 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)                                                                                 (27)      
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The government stimulates economic driving by setting the tax rate on fuel higher than the marginal 
damage of CO2-emissions. The tax on mileage is set below the mileage-related damage per kilometer. 
Summing equations (26) and (27) implies that  
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
∗∗ + 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚∗∗
𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) .                                                                                            (28)      
The tax on fuel plus the tax on mileage equals the marginal damage of CO2-emissions plus the 
mileage-related marginal damage measured per liter fuel. The sum of these taxes thus equals the sum 
of the Pigouvian taxes.  
 
One may argue that a road user charge based on odometer readings or pay-as-you-drive insurance 
combined with congestion charges and toll roads resembles GPS-based road user charges. Optimal tax 
formulas presented in equation (26) and (27) should be employed in this case. However, such charges 
are costly to administer, susceptible to evasion, and lead to undesirable traffic planning designed to 
avoid toll stations, see Parry (2002).  
5. Parameter values  
Optimal tax rates are determined by the variables on the right side of equation (23), (26) and (27). This 
section presents empirical estimates of these variables.  
5.1 Marginal damage 
The marginal damage of CO2 emissions, or social cost of carbon, has been estimated by more than 
100 peer-reviewed studies according to the report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (2007). The average cost estimate is $43 per ton of CO2. A cost estimate of $50 is 
common, as some recent estimates are higher. Consumption of one liter of gasoline generates 2.32 kg 
CO2, which amounts to approximately $0.44 per gallon of gasoline; see table 1. This estimate is 
relevant for countries facing a quota price which equals the social cost of carbon, and for countries 
concerned with the global damage of carbon emissions.  
 
The average mileage-related marginal damage related to road transport for the US and the UK 
amounts to $1.92 and $2.92 per gallon of gasoline, respectively, according to Parry and Small (2005). 
Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) show that accident-related externalities are related to the weight of 
vehicles. Internalizing such externalities by a weight-varying mileage tax or a $0.97-$2.17 per gallon 
of gasoline tax is similar for most vehicles according to their estimates. Thune-Larsen et al. (2016) 
finds that the average mileage-related damage in Norway for all road transport amounts to NOK 4,78 
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per liter gasoline and NOK 6,53 per liter diesel. The literature identifies substantial differences in 
mileage-related damage between rural and non-rural areas, peak and off-peak periods, heavy and light-
duty vehicles, and between different speed levels. Such differentiation is to some extent feasible with 
toll roads and a GPS-based system. The average marginal damage is however relevant with a uniform 
tax on fuel, see Diamond (1973).   
5.2 Traffic behavior  
The assumption that motorists choose driving and time spent driving to maximize utility implies that 
utility maximizing fuel-saving measures are implemented. A change in fuel-saving behavior represents 
a change from a utility optimum. Elasticities are therefore chosen based on changes in optimal 
choices.  
 
The elasticity of fuel consumption per kilometer with respect to time spent driving per kilometer, 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑), equals the percentage change in liters of fuel consumption per kilometer when the driving 
time per kilometer increases by one per cent. Fuel economy testes uncover that this percentage 
reduction in fuel consumption is larger when the initial speed is higher. A highway speed reduction of 
1 per cent results in a reduction in fuel consumption per kilometer of approximately 1 per cent, see e.g. 
Wang et al. (2008). The link between fuel consumption and time spent driving within city centers is 
more complex, see Tong et al. (2000). Time spent on economic driving however includes a range of 
techniques, see Barkenbus 2010, Carrico et al., 2009; Onoda, 2009; Tong et al., 2000; Van Mierlo et 
al., 2004; Vandenbergh et al., 2008. An elasticity equal to minus one is chosen in a base line scenario 
based on these studies.  
 
Several studies show that increases in fuel prices result in relatively modest reductions in vehicle miles 
traveled, see Johansson and Schipper (1997), Fridstrøm and Steinsland (2014) and Madslien and 
Kwong (2015) for the case of Norway. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) is therefore set equal to minus 0.1 in the base line 
scenario. Note that the elasticity of driving distance with respect to the tax rate, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙), deviates 
from the elasticity with respect to the price of fuel.   
 
The economic incentive to save fuel increases when the tax on fuel is increased. The price elasticity of 
gasoline differs between empirical studies. A bench-mark price elasticity of -0.55 is chosen in Parry 
and Small (2005). Approximately half of this reduction was attributed to changes in vehicles miles 
traveled. Hence, the remaining half is the result of improved fuel economy due to choic of vehicle and 
driving-style. Empirical studies show that choice of vehicle is influenced by the price of gasoline, see 
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Sallee et al. (2016) and Busse et al. (2013). Empirical studies also show that economic driving 
improves fuel economy, see Barkenbus 2010, Carrico et al., 2009; Onoda, 2009; Tong et al., 2000; 
Van Mierlo et al., 2004; Vandenbergh et al., 2008. It is however challenging to pinpoint the exact 
contribution due to economic driving. Hence, three scenarios are presented where the elasticity of 
economic driving with respect to the tax rate on fuel, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙), is close to zero, equals 0.05 and 0.17. 
Empirical studies of fuel economy responses in the Norwegian economy suggests a lower elasticity of 
economic driving. A scenario where the elasticity, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙), equals 0.02 is included. Note that the 
elasticity is larger than zero within the model framework, see appendix E.        
 
Less aggressive driving at lower speeds contribute to lower accidents according to Aarts and van 
Schagen, 2006, van Benthem, 2015, Rodriguez, 1990, Montag, 2014, and Elvik et al. 2019. An 
average reduction in speeds of 10 percent generates a reduction in fatal accidents of 37.8 percent, 
while accidents without injuries are expected to decline by 10 percent according to Elvik et al. (2004). 
Lower speeds also generate less noise pollution, see Bendtsen (2004). Lave (1985) however finds no 
connection between average speed and fatal accidents. He finds a clear connection between fatalities 
and spreading in speed, see also Aarts and van Schagen (2006) and Elvik (2014). An economic 
driving-style, and a larger spread in speeds, may however boost traffic congestion. The impact of 
economic driving on mileage-related damage is uncertain. Three scenarios are presented where the 
elasticity of mileage-related damage with respect to time spent driving, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑), equals 0, -0,3 and 
-0,5.    
6. Optimal versus current tax rates  
Optimal tax rates based on empirical estimates are compared with real world taxes in the US, the UK 
and Norway. Basic tax theory is however unable to produce a unique optimal tax rate on polluting 
goods due to choic of normalization, see Fullerton (1997). The explanation is that the allocation of 
resources is unchanged when a uniform tax increase on consumer goods is combined with a 
proportional, revenue-neutral reduction in taxation of income. The welfare is unchanged by this 
                                                     
7 Example: Assume that the long-run price elasticity of gasoline consumption in the US equals minus one. This implies a gasoline tax rate 
elasticity of approximately -0.2 as the tax rate amounts to approximately 20 percent of the price. Assume that 50 percent of the price 
response is due to reductions in vehicle miles traveled. This implies that the vehicle miles traveled elasticity with respect to the gasoline tax 
rate equals -0.1. The remaining 50 percent of the price response is due to lower fuel consumption per miles traveled. Assuming that choice of 
vehicle and choice of driving style is equally important implies a fuel consumption per mile traveled elasticity with respect to choice of 
driving style of -0.05.           
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reform even though the tax rate on polluting goods is increased. Hence, optimal tax rates derived 
above are compared to current differences in tax rates between fuel and non-polluting goods. Toll on 
toll roads represents a tax on road transport that comes in addition to today's fuel taxes. The current 
difference in tax rates between fuel and non-polluting goods therefore includes fees on toll roads. 
Marginal damage estimates and current tax rates on gasoline and road use are presented in table 1. 
Current tax rates in table 1 are compared with optimal tax rates presented in table 2-4. Road user 
charges based on GPS-tracking is not implemented in full scale in the US, the UK and Norway. 
Hence, a comparison with optimal GPS-based taxes is omitted.   
 
The tax rates on fuels differ substantially across countries. The average US tax on gasoline amounted 
to 47 cents per gallon in 2018 according to the US Energy Information Administration. The average 
combined sales tax (8.4 percent according to Thomson Reuters, 2015) of spending the cost of one 
gallon of gasoline on non-polluting goods amounts to approximately 17.8 cents. Thus, the current tax 
difference between gasoline and non-polluting goods amounts to approximately 29 cents per gallon of 
gasoline in the US. The average toll per gallon of gasoline amounts to approximately 9 cents, see the 
discussion in Bjertnæs (2017). The current US tax difference between gasoline and non-polluting 
goods, including fees for toll roads, equals 0.38 dollar per gallon of gasoline. The tax difference 
between gasoline and non-polluting consumer goods in the UK amounts to the gasoline tax of £0.5795 
per liter of gasoline, or $2.69 per gallon, see UK (2019). The additional value-added tax is levied on 
most goods including gasoline, and thus does not influence the tax difference. Toll per gallon of 
gasoline on roads and bridges in the UK is marginal, see Bjertnæs (2017). The Norwegian tax rate 
(wedge) on gasoline equals NOK 6.43 per liter in 2019. Simple calculations show that the average toll 
from toll roads amounts to approximately NOK 2 per liter gasoline. Hence, the total tax wedge on 
gasoline amounts to approximately NOK 8.43 per liter.  
 
Table 1: Tax rates and costs: USD per gallon of gasoline.    
 The cost of CO2 
emissions 
Average mileage- 
related costs 
Current tax difference, 
gasoline vs. goods    
Current fees, 
toll road   
Current tax 
plus fees   
USA 0.44 1.92 0.29  0.09 0.38 
UK  0.44 2.92 2.69 0 2.69 
Nor 0.44 2.26 3.04 0.97 4.01 
 
The current US tax in table 1 is compared with optimal tax rates presented in table 2. Scenario A1 
assumes that the choice of driving style does not affect the extent of mileage-related damage of road 
transport. The empirical support for this assumption is weak. The scenario is however constructed to 
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illustrate the impact of avoidance. The optimal combination of taxes on gasoline and mileage equals 
the marginal damage of gasoline and kilometers driven, respectively. A tax on gasoline only should be 
set equal to the marginal damage of CO2 emissions plus half of the mileage-related damage caused by 
road transport. The explanation is that the road user charge on gasoline is avoided by choosing a more 
economical driving-style. The percentage reduction in gasoline consumption per kilometer due to 
economic driving equals the percentage reduction in miles driven. Hence, gains due to lower mileage-
related damage generated by the tax on gasoline is halved as motorists responds by choosing a more 
economic driving-style. The optimal tax is reduced accordingly. 
  
Table 2, Elasticities, marginal damage and optimal tax rates for the US, USD per gallon of gaso-
line 
Scenario 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)  𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙∗∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚∗∗𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 
A1 -1 -0.1 0.1 0 0.44 1.92 1.4 0.44 1.92 
A2 -1 -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.44 1.92 1.88 1.4 0.96 
A3 -1 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.44 1.92 1.69 1.02 1.34 
A4 -1 -0.1 0.05 -0.3 0.44 1.92 1.91 1.02 1.34 
A5 -1 -0.1 0 -0.3 0.44 1.92 2.36 1.02 1.34 
 
In scenarios A2 and A3, it is assumed that a more economical driving style generates a significant 
reduction in the mileage-related damage from road transport. The optimal combination of taxes on 
gasoline and driving changes drastically compared to scenario A1. The tax on gasoline is increased to 
1.4 in scenario A2 and 1.02 in scenario A3 to reap the rewards of reduced mileage-related damage. 
The tax rate on mileage is reduced accordingly to maintain an optimal tax burden on driving. The total 
tax on gasoline and driving equals the marginal damage of driving. The optimal tax on gasoline only is 
significantly lower than the sum of the marginal damage from greenhouse gases and mileage-related 
damage. A more economic driving-style leads to avoidance of road user charges on gasoline, and 
hence contributes to lower the optimal tax rate. The economic driving-style also contributes to lower 
mileage-related damage. Such gains contribute to increase the optimal tax rate on gasoline. The first 
effect is stronger however. This explains why the optimal tax rate is below the total marginal damage 
of driving.   
 
In scenario A4, it is assumed that the choice of economic driving style is less sensitive to changes in 
the tax on gasoline compared to scenario A3. The scenario is otherwise identical to scenario A3. The 
change does not affect the optimal combination of taxes on gasoline and kilometers driven. However, 
the optimal tax rate on gasoline only increases from 1.69 to 1.91. The explanation is that the tax on 
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gasoline leads to less tax avoidance due to economic driving. The tax becomes a more efficient tool 
designed to lowering mileage-related damage in this scenario. Hence, it is optimal to set a higher tax 
rate on gasoline.  
 
Scenario A5 illustrates the case where taxes on gasoline do not affect the choice of driving style. The 
empirical support for this assumption is weak. The scenario is however constructed to illustrate the 
solution when choice of driving-style is not considered. The scenario is otherwise identical to 
scenarios A3 and A4. The optimal combinations of taxes on gasoline and driving is identical with 
combinations in scenarios A3 and A4. The optimal tax rate on gasoline only equals the marginal 
damage of CO2 emissions plus the marginal damage of mileage-related externalities. The explanation 
is that the tax does not lead to efficiency losses due to avoidance. Hence, it is optimal to set the tax 
equals to the total marginal damage of driving.    
 
Optimal UK tax rates are presented in table 3. A comparison with current tax rates in table 1 shows 
that the optimal tax rate on gasoline only is below the current tax rate on gasoline in all scenarios 
where taxes stimulate economic driving. The optimal tax rate is higher than the current tax rate in 
scenario B5, where economic driving is unaffected by taxation of gasoline. A transition to GPS-based 
road user charges leads to different results. The optimal tax rate on gasoline exceeds the marginal 
damage of CO2 emissions by a substantial margin in scenarios where economic driving lowers 
mileage-related damage. The explanation is that the tax on gasoline is able to harvest such gains, while 
the GPS-based tax is unable to harvest these gains.  
 
Table 3, Elasticities, marginal damage and optimal tax rates for the UK, USD per gallon of 
gasoline 
Scenario 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)  𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙∗∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚∗∗𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 
B1 -1 -0.1 0.1 0 0.44 2.92 1.9 0.44 2.92 
B2 -1 -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.44 2.92 2.63 1.9 1.46 
B3 -1 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.44 2.92 2.34 1.32 2.04 
B4 -1 -0.1 0.05 -0.3 0.44 2.92 2.39 1.32 2.04 
B5 -1 -0.1 0 -0.3 0.44 2.92 3.36 1.32 2.04 
 
Optimal Norwegian taxes is presented in table 4. A comparison of current and optimal tax rates show 
that the current Norwegian tax on gasoline is almost twice as large as the optimal tax on gasoline in 
most scenarios. The Norwegian tax rate (wedge) on diesel equals NOK 5.16 in 2019. Toll from toll 
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roads amounts to approximately NOK 2 per liter. Hence, the total tax wedge on diesel amounts to 
approximately NOK 7.16 per liter. A comparison with the optimal tax rates for diesel, scenario N7 and 
N8 in table 4, shows that the current tax rate is higher than the optimal tax rate. Table 4 also presents 
optimal combinations of taxes on fuel and mileage when GPS-based road user charges is introduced.  
 
Table 4, Elasticities, marginal damage and optimal tax rates for Norway, NOK per liter gasoline  
Scenario 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)  𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙∗∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚∗∗𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 
N1 -1 -0,1 0,1 0 0,93 4,78 3,32 0,93 4,78 
N2 -1 -0,1 0,1 -0,5 0,93 4,78 4,52 3,32 2,39 
N3 -1 -0,1 0,1 -0,3 0,93 4,78 4,04 2,36 3,35 
N4 -1 -0,1 0,05 -0,3 0,93 4,78 4,59 2,36 3,35 
N5 -1 -0,1 0,02 -0,3 0,93 4,78 5,15 2,36 3,35 
N6 -1 -0,1 0 -0,3 0,93 4,78 5,71 2,36 3,35 
N7 -1 -0,1 0,1 -0,3 1,06 6,53 5,30 3,02 4,58 
N8 -1 -0,1 0,02 -0,3 1,06 6,53 6,83 3,02 4,58 
7. Conclusion 
Many countries have implemented taxes on fuel to curb externalities linked to both fuel and mileage. 
However, the tax-induced gain in terms of reduced externalities is diminished as less than half of the 
reduction in fuel use is due to reduced driving, see Parry and Small (2005) which argue that the 
optimal tax rates on gasoline are reduced accordingly. The remaining reduction is due to improved 
fleet fuel efficiency. Fleet fuel efficiency improves as households avoid the mileage-related tax 
component on fuel by purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles. Bjertnæs (2019) however shows that 
such avoidance should be prevented by imposing heavier taxation of fuel-efficient vehicles compared 
to fuel-intensive vehicles, and hence, that it is sub-optimal to lower the tax rate on gasoline. However, 
fleet fuel efficiency also improves as households choose a more fuel-efficient driving-style. The tax on 
fuel may create an incentive to save fuel rather than lowering mileage-related damage. The present 
study contributes to the literature by exploring how taxes on fuel and road use should be designed to 
combat driving related externalities when agents choose driving-style.     
 
The study shows that the efficient road user charge on fuel is below the marginal mileage-related 
damage to prevent tax avoidance due to an excessive economic driving-style, even though accidents 
are reduced. The current US tax rate on gasoline is way below the efficient rate while the current UK 
rate is slightly above the efficient rate in this case. The study also calculates optimal combination of 
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taxes on fuel and road use. An efficient tax on fuel exceeds the marginal damage of CO2-emissions to 
promote an economic driving-style when the tax is combined with a GPS-based tax on road use. The 
efficient GPS-based tax rate is reduced below the marginal damage of mileage-related externalities in 
this case to prevent excessive taxation of driving.  
 
Electric vehicle owners avoid all taxes levied on fuel. A GPS-based road user charge may of course be 
levied on electric vehicles. An interesting question however is whether results in the present study is 
relevant for electric vehicles, i.e. whether it is desirable to combine GPS-based road user charges for 
electric vehicles with taxes on public charging points to promote an economic driving-style which 
lowers accidents. Future research may elaborate on this issue.  
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Appendix  
A. Second order conditions for the social planner problem:  
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚′𝑚𝑚 < 0                                                                                                                               (A1)   
−𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) −𝑤𝑤 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) = 0                                                                       (A2)   
−𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 < 0                                                                  (A3)   
The condition for a local optimum is satisfied. The condition for a global optimum is assumed to be 
satisfied.  
 
B. Second order conditions for the household problem: 
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚′𝑚𝑚 < 0                                                                                                                               (A4)   
−(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) −𝑤𝑤 = 0                                                                                                     (A5)   
−(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 < 0                                                                                                        (A6)   
The condition for a local optimum is satisfied. The condition for a global optimum is assumed to be 
satisfied.  
 
C. First order conditions for the government optimization problem.  
            𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙           (A7)     
−𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 0 
so that 
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙))𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 + 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 + 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙))𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙               (A8)   +𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) + 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) + 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 
Multiplying first order conditions for the household (18) with 𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙and (19) with ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙  gives    
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
′
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙                                                            (A9)   
 and                                                                                     
𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟
′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) + 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) = −𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)                                             (A10)   
Implementing equation (A9) and (A10) into equation (A8) gives  
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙))𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)                          (A11)   +𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 
Hence, 
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) � 11+𝑟𝑟′�ℎ𝑑𝑑�ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚�𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙�
𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑�𝑚𝑚
′
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
�                                                                                  (A12)  
+𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑) ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 � 11+𝑟𝑟′�ℎ𝑑𝑑�ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚�𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙�
𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑�𝑚𝑚
′
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
� 
Hence,  
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) � 11+𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑�𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) �                                                                             (A13) 
+ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)
𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1
1+
1
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑
𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑�𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) ⎦⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
  
25 
Hence,  
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
∗ = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) � 11+𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑�𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) �                                                                             (A14) 
+ 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑
𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑) 𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑(ℎ𝑑𝑑)𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(ℎ𝑑𝑑)
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1
1+
1
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑
𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑�𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) ⎦⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
D. Second order conditions for the government problem   
𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 + 𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′(ℎ𝑑𝑑)ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙                           (A15)  
  −𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙     −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) −𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 
                      −𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) 
                         −𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚
′
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙  
                            −𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙) − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 < 0 
Parameter values are restricted to those that satisfies this condition.  
 
E.  
Taking the derivative of equation (19) implies that  
              −𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑 − (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 0                                                                                (A16) 
              ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑−(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙+𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑′ℎ𝑑𝑑 > 0                                                                                             (A17) 
Taking the derivative of equation (18) implies that 
 𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)� + (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 + 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 + 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙                                                  (A18)  
           Hence, 
 𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�+(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙+𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)𝑟𝑟′ℎ𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙+𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚′𝑚𝑚                                                                             (A19) 
Inserting for ℎ𝑑𝑑′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙gives 
             𝑚𝑚′𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 = 𝑟𝑟�ℎ𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙)�𝑒𝑒′𝑚𝑚′𝑚𝑚 < 0                                                                                                       (A20) 
